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Heterodox Economics: History and Prospects 
A review essay drawing on Frederic S Lee, A History of Heterodox Economics: 




Fred Lee’s aim in this volume is to write a history of heterodox economics in the 
twentieth century. The act of writing such a history is a phenomenon of note in itself. It 
reflects his view that there is a coherent body of th ught which is of long standing whose 
history can and should be told. What is implied is that the body of thought is coherent in 
the sense that it is possible to identify common threads in heterodox economics and a 
community of some sort among heterodox economists. It i  of long standing in the sense 
that there has been some continuity between one era and the next. And it should be told in 
the sense that it is important for heterodox economics to reflect on and understand its past 
in order better to move forward. While this view might be controversial for orthodox 
economists, it would hardly be controversial for heterodox economists. Indeed for many 
heterodox economists, who may have felt isolated until gradually becoming aware of the 
heterodox community, it will be not only instructive but also a great pleasure to read the 
detail of what went before. 
 Fred Lee is to be heartily congratulated for putting this volume together, drawing 
on a series of papers published over the years. It is not presented as an intellectual 
history. Rather it is primarily a history of the community of the subset of heterodox 
economists in the Marxian, Post Keynesian and more generally radical circles in the US 
and the UK (although the last two chapters broaden th  scope). The history itself has a 
particular character, being compiled in a way which is fully consistent with the author’s 
own methodological argument for ‘grounded theory’. It is replete with tabulated records 
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of heterodox economics reflected in textbook contents, publications, institutional 
arrangements, participation, and so on. These data add considerable weight to the account 
given of the development of heterodox economics through the twentieth century.  
Further, some of the essays were originally written with a particular strategic 
purpose, demonstrating the consequences of the Research Assessment Exercise in the 
UK, commenting on subject benchmarking in the UK, or setting out an alternative 
methodology for ranking heterodox journals, for example. The essays are thus important 
contributions to the furtherance of heterodox economics, reflecting the author’s strategy 
of engaging directly with the institutional mechanisms of the day. Indeed, because of the 
author’s activism with respect to heterodox economics, it seems reasonable to 
understand, and appreciate, the contribution of the volume partly in these strategic terms. 
The subtitle’s reference to ‘challenging the mainstream’ reinforces such an interpretation. 
 There is a wealth of detail in the book, which read rs are encouraged to explore 
for themselves. The purpose of this essay is rather to xplore some of the broader issues 
raised by the volume, and to use this discussion as the basis for looking forward to the 
future of heterodox economics and its place within t e discipline. But we begin with a 
brief account of the contents of the book. This is followed by a reflection on issues both 
of definition and strategy which arise from the volume, and then on the approach taken to 
presenting the material in relation to the place of history of thought and methodology in 
heterodox economics. The discussion concludes with some reflections on the future of 
heterodox economics. 
 
Summary of the Volume 
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The volume is divided into three Parts, dealing with heterodox economics in the US and 
in the UK and the current state of heterodox economics, respectively. The focus in both 
of the first two Parts is on Marxist-radical and Post Keynesian economics. But, since this 
is a history of communities, and these communities w re often open to other heterodox 
approaches and heterodox economists from other countries, the actual coverage is 
sometimes wider. In addition to the 39 tables in the volume, the reader is directed to a 
further 27 tables in an appendix available on the author’s website. 
 The Introduction which precedes the three Parts explains the approach to be taken 
to this history. The scene is set (pages 2-4) with the argument that neoclassical economics 
had been continuously dominant throughout the twentieth century, challenging the view 
that pluralism had been evident in the first half of the century (Morgan and Rutherford 
1998). This argument justifies the starting point that there is a long history to recount; 
heterodox economics is not just a recent development, but was consistently repressed 
relative to the neoclassical orthodoxy. Further it is argued (pages 4-7) that heterodox 
economics takes the form of ‘blasphemy’ against the religion of neoclassical economics 
rather than ‘heresy’, in that it involved total rejection of orthodoxy, rather than deviation 
in limited respects. As such, heterodox economists have been treated with intolerance. 
Indeed a contrast is drawn between this intolerance and the pluralism of heterodox 
economics. An account is then given (pages 7-11) of the heterodox critiques of orthodox 
economics, stemming from the shared view that economic processes are inherently 
social. While different heterodox groupings have developed different critiques of 
mainstream economics, Lee (p.7) argues that, rather than a ‘disparate collection of 
critiques’, they constitute together ‘a concatenation of different heterodox critiques that 
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generate its dismissal’, thus providing ‘the basis for making heterodox economics quite 
distinct from mainstream economics’. Lee proceeds to explain the distinct 
methodological features of heterodox economics which follow from its concern with 
social processes, notably a rejection of an exclusively mathematical formalist 
methodology. He acknowledges however (on p. 17) that i  is more difficult to identify 
common theoretical ground.  
The emphasis of the chapters which follow is less on heterodox theory than on the 
community aspect of heterodox economics, albeit interconnected with the theoretical and 
methodological principles Lee has set out in this introductory chapter. This 
interdependence operates not only at the logistical level of communication and 
development of ideas, but also at the conceptual level. It is argued that, by not being 
deductivist, heterodox economics does not take a hierarchical view either of theory or of 
its own community. The first two Parts focus on the particular communities of 
Marxian/Post Keynesian/radical economists in the US and the UK, respectively. The 
third part broadens the scope, reflecting the international character of the heterodox 
community which has been actively promoted by the Association for Heterodox 
Economists (AHE). 
 The first essay in Part I provides an overview of the suppression of heterodoxy in 
the US in the twentieth century, while the following chapters focus respectively on the 
periods 1945-70, 1965-80 and 1971-95. In these chapters, Lee charts the suppression of 
heterodox economics in the US by the orthodoxy from the late nineteenth century, when 
economics was already being defined in terms of the neoclassical orthodoxy, and its re-
emergence in the post-McCarthy era. But because of the suppression of teaching of 
 5 
Marxism, radical economics in the 1970s developed its own character which went 
beyond traditional Marxism, in particular being more theoretically pluralist. In the 1970s, 
heterodox economics was strengthened by the climate of political activism, which 
required an economics which engaged with political economy issues, and also by 
institutional developments, notably the formation of the Union of Radical Political 
Economy (URPE) and the emergence of publication outlets such as the Journal of Post 
Keynesian Economics. Institutional developments were also important for the 
development during this period of Post Keynesian economics in the US, notably at 
Rutgers, influenced by connections with Cambridge (England).  
 In the first two chapters in Part II Lee explores the history of heterodox 
economics in the UK in the periods 1900-70 and 1970- 6, respectively. We see the 
importance of Cambridge for UK heterodox economics increasingly from the 1940s. 
Before then the Workers’ Educational Association (WEA) had provided a focus for the 
development of radical thought. But, as in the US, the Cold War era saw suppression of 
Marxism. The strengthening of heterodox economics from the 1970s paralleled that in the 
US, within new fora like the Conference of Socialist Economists (CSE) and the Post 
Keynesian Economics Study Group (PKSG) and the founding of the Cambridge Journal 
of Economics. Several streams emerged within radical economics, such as Sraffians, neo-
Ricardians and institutionalists, and heterodox gatherings covered a very broad church. 
The political conditions had been different from the US, so that earlier suppression of 
heterodox thought had been less direct than under McCarthy. But with the rise of peer 
review of research and journal rankings, the threat to heterodox economics was more 
direct in the UK from the 1980s with the implementation of the Research Assessment 
 6 
Exercise (RAE), which became the basis for government funding of University research, 
with implications for hiring. The last two chapters in Part II are therefore devoted to a 
detailed analysis of the RAE and its impact on heterodox economics in the UK in the 
periods 1989-96 and 2000-2003, respectively. 
 The first chapter in Part III addresses the current state of heterodox economics as 
a whole, reviewing the history of the AHE, of which the author was founder and which 
has been a catalysing force in the development of the community of heterodox 
economists. In the second chapter in this Part, an alternative method of ranking heterodox 
journals and economics departments is put forward which reflects the principle of 
promoting research development through what Lee calls ‘research dependency’ within 
the heterodox community, ie drawing on each others’ re earch. Again, what is proposed 
reflects the interpretation of the heterodox community as being non-hierarchical and also 
the importance of a curriculum in economics education which includes heterodox 
economics. This is a constructive effort at providing an alternative to the RAE and its 
successor the Research Excellence Framework, but one which recognises the legitimacy 
of different research communities.  
 
Reflections on Heterodoxy 
Lee points out in his Introduction, quite reasonably, that any such detailed community 
history is bound to be particularly limited in scope, so that this is not a comprehensive 
history of heterodox economics in the twentieth century. Nevertheless Lee draws on a 
wide range of sources and uses a range of methods for gathering such evidence, so that 
the account offers much more than one individual’s experience. It is also unusual in its 
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emphasis on recent community history. It therefore provides an excellent basis for future 
discussion about community and community-building.  
But Lee is careful to point out that the scope of a community history is also 
limited in that it inevitably reflects the author’s own experience and thus his own 
perspective. Readers may well have different experiences and have interpreted the history 
differently. Indeed it invites the reader to challeng  her own experience. To illustrate, I 
approached the volume with a particular interest in comparing the US and UK 
experiences. Like the author, I too have experienced heterodox economics on both sides 
of the Atlantic (in my case, the UK in the 1960s, Canada in the 1970s and the UK 
thereafter). I was exposed to radical economics in Ca ada in the admirably pluralist 
department at the University of Manitoba and then in the context of practical policy 
implementation at the provincial government level. I remember an acknowledged, but 
debated, sense of difference from orthodox economics (ie there was communication 
across the orthodox–heterodox divide). I also remember a sense of openness, and an 
engagement with policy issues, among heterodox economists themselves.  Latterly I 
became aware of the newly-emerging Post Keynesian eco omics and was delighted to 
find, through the appearance of the new Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, that there 
were others out there pursuing a similar approach. But, coming back later to the UK with 
a new-found interest in understanding differences btween schools of thought at a 
methodological level (ie methodological pluralism), I came across mainstream 
economists who thought it inappropriate to draw attention to difference, on the grounds 
that economics had continued a long British tradition as an open and tolerant discipline. 
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Nor did I perceive much support from what appeared to be a traditional monist approach 
within Marxism.  
 Reading Lee’s history, I realise how much these perceived differences between 
North America and the UK were a product of my particular experience. The account is 
given here of fierce arguments within UK radical-Marxism, which supports my earlier 
perception of a tendency towards traditional monism within each camp compared to 
North America. But I now realise that UK radical-Marxist economics was more open and 
pluralist than I had understood at the time. But at the same time I also understand better 
why US radical-Marxism had seemed more accessible to someone without prior training 
in Marxism. 
 Aside from the interpretation of particular episodes, we should consider the more 
fundamental issues surrounding the writing of a history of heterodox economics and 
Lee’s interpretation of that project. The first issue is his starting point of arguing that 
twentieth century economics was never really pluralist, only pluralist in the sense of ideas 
which lead to periodic modifications to the mainstream (the ‘continuity-pluralism 
thesis’). This is important, since the purpose of the history is to trace the continuous 
development of non-mainstream thought, rather than pluralist episodes. A contrary 
argument has been put forward by Davis (2008), who sees the history of economics in 
terms of alternating pluralism and monism, with thecurrent phase one of pluralism (see 
further Davis 2009). 
 The difference, I would suggest, lies in how we understand pluralism, as well as 
how we understand heterodox economics. For example, Davis identifies the post-
Marshall period in Cambridge as one of pluralism. But some have challenged how much 
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impact this plurality of ideas had on mainstream economics and even how far it was in 
fact pluralistic (see eg Tily 2007). At the level of theoretical approach there was no 
Keynesian revolution (see eg Hutton 1986). In other wo ds this was not a turn towards 
heterodoxy. And Davis never claims that radical-Marxist ideas ever came to dominate in 
the UK or the US, although, as Lee shows, there was a continuing tradition. So any 
pluralism was limited and arguably did not really include most of what we would now 
think of as heterodox economics.  
 Nevertheless, I would argue that there was a change i  mainstream economics 
through the twentieth century with respect to pluralism which Lee does not acknowledge. 
The experience of economics in the UK at least, prior to the 1970s, was of a more 
pluralist discipline than now, in the sense suggested by Morgan and Rutherford (1998) 
for the US in the interwar period. They characterised this pluralism in terms of objectivity 
being associated with even-handedness with respect to different arguments and different 
types of argument. No doubt this relative openness wa supported at the time by the 
widespread teaching of history of thought and economic history alongside economic 
theory. But the rise of formalism from the 1960s narrowed the range of acceptable styles 
of argument and thus also of content, reducing mainstream pluralism. Nevertheless Lee is 
probably right in arguing that this pluralism did not extend to radical-Marxian economics. 
By focusing so much of his history on this approach, Lee inevitably comes to conclusions 
which apply particularly to that approach, which might even suggest one possible 
definition of heterodox economics as being that which is politically suppressed. 
Indeed we cannot pursue this line of discussion further without addressing the 
classification of heterodox economics itself, which can be approached in a variety of 
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ways, and a history has a role in addressing that issue. By setting out a community history 
Lee appeals in the first instance to an understanding of heterodox economics in 
sociological terms. He shows that heterodox economics can be understood in terms of 
social networks, encompassing activities such as conferences, electronic mailings (of 
which the Heterodox Economics Newsletter which Lee initiated is an exemplar) and 
publications. There has always been considerable overlap between heterodox schools of 
thought, as evidenced by the range of social networks, attendance at conferences and the 
scope of heterodox journals. This demonstrates that there is some commensurability 
between heterodox schools of thought, allowing effectiv  communication. Particularly 
before the late twentieth century, there were only a imited number of heterodox events 
and publishing outlets and, as argued in this volume, there was within them an openness 
to a range of heterodox opinion. But ironically, perhaps, the increasing number of 
heterodox events and outlets which represents the growing strength of heterodox 
economics has allowed for more specialisation within eterodox economics. This is 
reflected in the relatively low degree of cross-refe ncing between a sample of heterodox 
journals as demonstrated in chapter 11. 
 A sociological approach has also been used to support a definition of heterodox 
economics as the obverse of mainstream economics. For example this follows from the 
definition by some of mainstream economics as whatever the most prestigious 
economists think (Colander, Holt and Rosser 2004) or whatever is taught in the top 
schools, is published in the top journals and attracts the most funding (Dequech 2007). 
But Lee goes further than this kind of negative definition of heterodox economics by 
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constructing a positive delineation in terms of core p inciples at the levels of ontology, 
methodology and theory. He acknowledges differences between heterodox subgroups, to 
which we would add differences within schools of thought (see eg King’s, 2011, 
discussion of Post Keynesian economics). Nevertheless Lee adds to his attempt at 
classification of heterodox economics a listing of schools of thought. Although the first 
two Parts of the book restrict coverage to Marxist/Post Keynesian/radical economists, 
Lee elsewhere includes other schools of thought such as neo-Austrian economics when 
discussing the scope of the AHE for example (see also p. 6). But including neo-Austrian 
economics in particular challenges the stress on political forces for repression which play 
such a major part in the history told in this volume and thus the scope for definition in 
political terms. 
 The differences between candidate heterodox schools f thought manifest 
themselves most clearly at the level of theory (as Lee, p. 17, acknowledges). There are 
also methodological differences between the schools f thought we might consider, 
although Lee (p. 9) lists a somewhat disparate range of ‘core methodological elements, 
such as critical realism, non-equilibrium or historical modelling, and the gendering and 
emotionalizing agency’. The most promising level at which to identify commonality 
would therefore seem to be the meta-methodological, or philosophical level. In this vein, 
Dow (1985) identified a difference in mode of thought between mainstream economics 
on the one hand and Marxian, neo-Austrian and Post Keynesian economics on the other. 
The former is deductivist and reductionist, lending tself to mathematical formalism, 
while the latter involves a pluralistic range of reasoning and a focus on real problems 
                                                
4 Kuhn has recently been turned on his head by those such as Fuller (2003) who argue that, not only did 
incommensurability exclude alternative paradigms to the mainstream, but it also protected the mainstream 
from outside critique. 
 12 
within an organic framework. There is now a large and important body of work focusing 
on methodological foundations of heterodox thought. T us for example Milonakis and 
Fine (2009) emphasise foundations of methodology in their history of political economy 
(a term which is arguably coincident with heterodox economics). In moving similarly 
below the levels of theory and content of methodology, King (2011) identifies 
methodological pluralism as the commonality which could best define heterodox 
economics. 
 Within this focus on the meta-methodological level, Lawson’s body of work in 
critical realism (most fully set out in Lawson 1997) has been particularly important, 
spearheadeding in economics the critical realist emphasis specifically on ontology. 
Lawson has accordingly developed a detailed ontological account of the social realm 
which Lee identifies as the common subject matter of heterodox economics. In 
addressing the specific issue of classifying heterodox economics and considering the 
drawbacks with other possible bases for classificaton, Lawson (2006) argues that it be 
approached at the level of ontology. He points out tha the ontological foundations for the 
practice of economics are frequently unrecognised an undeclared, not just in the 
mainstream but also among heterodox economists. Were mo e analysis to be developed 
in relation to ontology some differences within heterodox economics would be clarified, 
and indeed some contradictions exposed, aiding the further development of heterodox 
theory. But most important, both for understanding and for strategy, is Lawson’s 
argument that the commonality in heterodox economics is an open-system ontology, just 
as the commonality in mainstream economics is an implicit closed-system ontology 
which is necessitated by an insistence on mathematical formalism. Were this ontological 
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differentiation to be recognised more widely among heterodox economists, such an 
understanding would in itself promote greater cohesion. 
 Open-system thinking can take a variety of forms involving a variety of 
combinations of openness and closure, such that the closed-system thinking which 
identifies mainstream economics can be seen as a special case (Chick and Dow 2005; see 
further Bigo 2006). But if all thinking which is not closed is open in some respect, is this 
another definition of heterodox economics as anythig which is not mainstream 
economics? Lee is ambiguous on this, arguing on page 13 for example that economics 
‘can be divided into at least two distinct approaches’, while on page 14 that ‘economics 
consists of two well-defined sub-fields – mainstream economics’ and ‘heterodox 
economics’.  
 This issue of the divide between orthodox and heterodox economics is of strategic 
importance. Chick (1995) considers a classification of strategies for addressing different 
theoretical approaches, based on her analysis of the physical sciences. She identifies four 
possible strategies: rejection, containment, paradox and synthesis. The rejection strategy, 
in the sense of an assertion of correctness, seems to go against the pluralist approach to 
heterodox economic advocated by Lee which advocates tol rance of difference. And yet 
most heterodox economists do reject mainstream economics. Indeed Lawson (2009: 94) 
defines heterodoxy in terms of rejection of some doctrine of orthodoxy, and proceeds to 
identify the mainstream insistence on mathematical formalism as what heterodox 
economics rejects.   
 The second strategy, containment, treats one approch r theory as a special case 
of the preferred approach or theory (as in Keynes’s general treatment which encompassed 
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uncertainty as well as certainty). This would involve allowing for the acceptability of 
some mainstream ethods (eg deductivist mathematics) in particular circumstances. But 
mainstream methodology as a general insistence on mathematical formalism in all 
circumstances cannot be contained as a special case; if mathematical formalism is only 
applicable in particular cases then insistence upon it is to be rejected (Lawson 2006, 
2009).   
 This brings us to the third strategy, paradox, which draws attention to the 
distinctive nature of open-system logic, where consistency is not as defined within a 
closed system (Dow 1990).  Indeed this strategy canilluminate the apparently 
contradictory use of the rejection strategy alongside the containment strategy, and 
pluralism. While pluralism suggests tolerance towards alternatives, paradoxically this 
does not extend to intolerance. Even within a pluralist pproach therefore rejection of an 
insistence on the exclusive reliance on mathematical formalism is justified. Rejection 
therefore need not be understood dualistically, but rather as engaging with the opposition 
by being prepared to engage in debate over approach. 
 The strategy which emerges from the volume is in fact to set aside a focus on 
opposition to the mainstream. Rather it is one of pr moting heterodox economics within a 
community separate from the mainstream (while tolerating the mainstream) and some 
specific strategies are suggested for community-building. Implicitly therefore the fourth 
of Chick’s strategies, synthesis, is being set aside. Yet this is what some have proposed. 
Colander (2000) and Garnett (2006), for example, argue that what is identified as the 
‘paradigm-warrior’ stance within the heterodox economics of the 1970s has been 
overtaken by pluralism which can extend from heterodox economics to mainstream 
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economics (see also Colander et al. 2004).4 By pluralism, Garnett means not just the 
tolerance of other positions but also openness to exchange of ideas across positions 
(Garnett 2010). Some have argued that even identifying schools of thought within 
heterodox economics sets up harmful barriers to exchange of ideas (see McCloskey 1990 
and Garnett 2006, for example). Indeed one of the arguments for focusing on the level of 
heterodox economics as an umbrella category is that it gets away from divisions into 
schools of thought and thus encourages cross-fertilisation of ideas (Garnett 2010). 
Similarly, Lawson (2009) considers differences within eterodox economics in terms of 
variety of focus, as a division of labour within the common overall heterodox project. 
 But others argue that all these categories refer to different open-system ontologies 
and methodologies within heterodox economics, and that identifying schools of thought 
in these terms serves to clarify exchanges between these different subgroupings (see Dow 
2004, for example). Mearman (2010) argues that any such boundaries are porous and 
provisional. But he identifies the norm in heterodox economics as being what he calls a 
‘classical’ approach to categorisation of heterodoxy relative to orthodoxy by means of 
fixed, mutually-exclusive categories which have no effect on the categories as objects, 
something which conflicts with an open-system approach. He argues instead for a 
‘modern’ approach whereby categories are fuzzy, non-exhaustive and constructed for 
particular purposes, such that the classification may affect the object itself. This approach 
is consistent with the (implicit or explicit) open-system ontology of heterodox economics, 
with its implications for epistemology, including an voidance of dualism.  
 Where then do we draw the (potentially provisional, porous) line between 
mainstream and heterodox economics? Whether or not there is an insistence on 
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mathematical formalism is one clear criterion, as put forward by Lawson (2006, 2009). 
But that this issue is not settled is illustrated by Lee’s references to Marshall as 
indisputably orthodox. This is important for example for his argument that economics in 
the US had not been pluralist since the end of the nin teenth century. Yet Marshall 
arguably had an open-system ontology, which led himto use only partial equilibrium 
models and to use verbal analysis. He is identified as an important influence on Post 
Keynesian economics (see Hamouda and Harcourt 1988, for example). Interpretation of 
Marshall is controversial within radical and Post Keynesian economics. The controversy 
demonstrates that the orthodox-heterodox divide can be misleading when applied to 
individuals or bodies of thought which are evolving and subject to different 
interpretations from different perspectives. But the example of radically different 
appreciations of Marshall within heterodox economics reinforces the difficulty Lee faces 
in identifying the common ground. 
 In the meantime, the identification of mainstream economics as pluralist noted 
above is highly contestable. As Dequech (2007) points out, while there is openness to 
new ideas within the mainstream (and there have been some methodological changes 
with respect to admissible types of data for example), the mainstream has not shown 
itself to be open to the more fundamental methodological challenge posed by heterodox 
economics. If mainstream economics defines economics in terms of a particular (logical 
positivist) set of methodological principles, then challenges from a different 
methodological perspective are simply not recognised and communication is ruled out. 
Meador (2009) goes so far as to argue that orthodox and heterodox economics reflect 
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different epistemes, in the Foucauldian sense, which suggests that communication is 
impossible, with important implications for strategy.  
 While I would agree with Garnett’s (2006) argument that cross-fertilisation across 
epistemological divides has in the past produced several notable developments in 
economics,5 these have been the exception rather than the rule. Further they have 
occurred without a proper appreciation of what is involved in heterodox ideas at the 
meta-methodological level; this is not proper synthesis. Thus modern efforts to develop 
new behavioural economics for example, while picking up on many heterodox ideas, 
nevertheless are ultimately limited by the strictures of the mainstream meta-
methodological approach. It is therefore of great importance that any heterodox attempts 
to communicate ideas to the mainstream highlight also the underlying meta-
methodological differences. Indeed it has been argued again here how important it is to 
understand these differences for heterodox economics itself, and it is on the basis of these 
differences that strategy for the promotion of heterodox economics should be designed.  
 It would seem that the choice of strategy on the table is therefore between 
development in isolation from mainstream economics, as Lee proposes, and attempts to 
communicate with the mainstream. But it is unhelpful to think that the strategic choice is 
a stark one. There are good arguments for either strategy. Institutional power continues to 
be held by the mainstream, supported by the perception among those with economic 
power that it promotes their interests. From this pers ective, attempting to persuade has 
been proven to be a hopeless cause, and therefore the best hope is to focus on building up 
                                                
5 Foucault argues for example that Hume and Smith are on the cusp of the transition between two 
successive epistemes (see Vigo de Lima 2010). 
8 In Australia, efforts to reclassify history of economics as history were successfully resisted by historians 
of economics, and the research ranking of history of ec nomics journals actually increased. 
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strength within heterodox economics. On the other hand, there are sufficient signs of 
unease within the mainstream, particularly in the context of the unforeseen crisis (as in 
the setting up of the Institute for New Economic Thinking and the World Economics 
Association for example), that there may be scope fr persuasion, while there is none if 
heterodoxy doesn’t engage in discussion. The primary focus for persuasion need not even 
be to achieve acceptance of heterodox economics, but rather acceptance of the pluralist 
argument for tolerance, and thus for constructive debate.  
 Good arguments can be made for either strategy, but not for one exclusively. Just 
as heterodoxy embraces pluralism at a range of levels, this range can also include strategy 
itself (see further Dow 2000). The stronger strategy is to have a plurality of strategies, 
rather than reliance on only one. Most heterodox economists can usefully focus on 
pressing forward with building heterodox theory and i stitutions, without paying any 
attention to the mainstream. The reality-based approach of heterodox economics means 
that arguments which address real experience should be more compelling to government 
and to the general public. But the general understanding of economic arguments is 
normally mediated through mainstream economics, because of its position of power in 
the discipline. Addressing this problem, others within the heterodox community can most 
usefully keep lines of communication with the mainstream open, attempting to get across 
heterodox ideas, at least about tolerance. Others can continue articulating the critique of 
orthodoxy, thus informing the other two strategies. There are additional strategic 
possibilities which, in predominantly-mainstream departments, require persuasion of 
mainstream colleagues. Thus for example focussing on curriculum can be justified on 
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educational grounds (the benefits of teaching a range of approaches) rather than on the 
grounds of the superiority of heterodox economics as uch (see Garnett 2009).  
  
Historical Approach  
We now turn to consider this history of heterodox economics as history, and the 
methodological/historiographical principles implicitly or explicitly applied. There have 
been several good histories of schools of thought wit in heterodox economics (King 2002 
and Milonakis and Fine 2009, for example). While thse have referred to institutional 
factors, they are primarily intellectual histories. By focussing instead on community, 
Lee’s history seems in some respects to fit into the science studies approach to history of 
thought, emphasising the sociological aspects of scientific communities (see Hands 2001: 
chapter 5). But the main purpose of the science studies approach is to provide a 
framework to analyse the development of ideas, as an alternative to the positivist 
approach, which analyses the ideas themselves indepe ntly of the context of their 
development. This volume does not go so far, in that it is not intended as a history of 
ideas as such but rather of the social structure within which they developed. But it does 
support the science-studies view that this structure is important for understanding the 
development of ideas, and thus it is intended as a complement to a history of heterodox 
ideas. Further, the key concept from the sociology-f-scientific-knowledge (SSK) 
approach, reflexivity, is invoked in it being made cl ar that the selection of coverage of 
heterodox economics, and the interpretation offered, r flects the author’s own experience 
and perspective. But, importantly, this history does go further than science studies in 
pursuing the aim of actively promoting the building of the heterodox community. Also 
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the (post-?) modern science studies aims not to pass judgement on its histories, in favour 
of one set of ideas over another, whereas Lee openly challenges the mainstream 
approach.  
Further, while science studies attempts to avoid overarching ‘macro’ narratives in 
setting out thick ‘micro’ history, one of the notable strengths of Lee’s history is the 
interweaving of the micro level with the macro. While the science-studies approach is 
mostly of relatively recent origin, from the 1970s, Lee’s history shows the influence of an 
earlier Marxist literature on the social structure of science, analysing the role of science 
in promoting capitalism, but also being limited by capitalism: ‘the full development of 
science in the service of humanity is incompatible with the continuance of capitalism’ 
(Bernal 1939: 409). While the micro detail in this volume fits more readily into the more 
recent science-studies approach, the emphasis on the political economy background to the 
development of heterodox economics reflects the Marxist approach. Particularly in the 
chapters dealing with the US, politics is of central importance; the McCarthy era was 
important for the suppression of radical-Marxist thought, while the Vietnam War was a 
powerful radicalising force, for example. In the current climate, there is a focus on the 
pursuit of free-market policies from the 1980s in particular as a major (if not primary) 
cause of the banking crisis and subsequent economic crisis. This coincided with the 
implementation of institutional mechanisms which suppressed heterodox thought. 
Orthodox economics was encouraged to develop in such a way as to support capitalism. 
What is at issue is political and economic power. 
 As in the science-studies approach, Lee considers how both orthodox and 
heterodox thought evolves by means of persuasion within particular institutional 
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structures. The discussion therefore traces the evolution of these structures, with 
implications for the interconnected outcomes of curri lum, publishing and hiring. Lee 
discusses how peer review of publication has become an increasing factor in hiring and 
promotion decisions, as institutionalised in the RAE in the UK. The relatively low 
ranking given to heterodox publications has been a substantive factor in limiting the 
success of heterodox economists seeking academic pos tions. In line with a growing 
quantitative literature on academic publishing, including work on communication 
networks, Lee makes a range of contributions. A notable contribution is made by his 
efforts to put forward an alternative method to orth doxy for ranking journals. For 
example, rather than ignoring citations of other papers in the same journal, Lee argues 
that this provides valuable information about the strength of the intellectual network 
involved in, and promoted by, the journal.  
 But something which is notable by its absence from Lee’s account of the history 
of even only the radical-Marxian and Post Keynesian ub-communities is the role played 
by the history of thought and methodology communities. (Indeed Davis, 2008, includes a 
philosophical grouping, critical realism, in his classification of heterodox economics.) 
Probably the majority in these communities support orthodox economics broadly defined. 
For example, in the HOPE volume considering the future of the history of economics 
(Weintraub 2002), heterodox traditions are treated in a separate section at the end of the 
volume. Nevertheless, like heterodox economics, history of thought and methodology 
have both struggled to maintain a presence in highly-ranked publications and in the 
curriculum.8 By the criteria of Colander, Holt and Rosser (2004) or Dequech (2007), they 
would not count as mainstream economics. And indeed th re have been calls to reorient 
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history of economics away from economics to other scientific communities (see 
Weintraub 2002: Introduction, and Schabas 1992). But their journals and conferences 
have provided a welcome opportunity, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s when 
heterodox fora were limited, for heterodox economists to interact with each other, and 
also with more orthodox economists. Networks which cross over from history of thought 
and methodology to heterodox economics have also helped the development of the 
methodological expressions of heterodoxy and, increasingly, of accounts of its history. 
 Yet there has been impatience among some heterodox ec nomists with 
methodological discussion, or at least with an argument that it should be given less 
attention now than in the paradigm-warrior stage (as discussed for example by Fontana 
and Gerrard 2006, and Lavoie 2009). This argument may hold force for the go-it-alone 
strategy, although this is not an argument Lee makes – indeed he also highlights the 
philosophy of critical realism, for example, as an important element of heterodox 
economics. But it is quite inappropriate for communications across the orthodox-
heterodox divide to ignore methodology if that divie is methodological in character. I 
would argue that it is the refusal by most mainstream economists to address 
methodological issues has been a very significant stumbling block in such attempts at 
communication.  
 
The Future of Heterodox Economics 
What then of the future of heterodox economics? Lee’s volume is as relevant for 
discussion of strategy as for discussion about the content of heterodox economics, and his 
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strategy is to emphasise the commonalities within heterodox economics as a distinctive 
alternative to the mainstream, indeed in opposition o the mainstream. But one of the 
most persuasive common elements is pluralism as an epistemological position to accept 
that the social world is so complex as to yield a range of analyses, each of which may 
reasonably be supported. From a pluralist perspective, a heterodox economist chooses not 
to follow the mainstream approach, for well-developd reasons, but this does not require 
denying the legitimacy of that approach per se; heterodox economists do think of 
mainstream economics as a school in economics (while normally the mainstream views 
heterodoxy as some form of sociology, history, politics or philosophy, not economics). 
From that starting-point, there is a range of strategies which can be followed, of which 
Lee’s strategy pays the least attention to the mainstream.10 Yet, given the power of the 
mainstream community, we have argued that it is wiser to opt for a range of strategies 
(including Lee’s strategy), pursued by different individuals and different subgroups, with 
differing degrees of engagement with the mainstream. Of these the most substantive body 
of work needs to be the development of heterodox analysis as a credible alternative to the 
mainstream. But the existing power structure in the profession and society more widely 
also needs to be addressed at the same time by additional strategies. Such a pluralist 
approach can be expected to strengthen heterodox economics in terms of community as 
well as theory. 
 The focus of Lee’s history is on economics departments. One strategy therefore 
not addressed is to stop considering heterodox economics as economics (as political 
economy, say, instead). This would take heterodox ec nomics out of the institutionalised 
                                                
10 He does allow for some engagement with the mainstream, noting the asymmetry of the lack of 
engagement in the reverse direction (page 14). 
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power net of mainstream economics. Many heterodox economists operate in other 
departments, either as a matter of choice or perforce, given hiring practices in mainstream 
economics departments. This development has been facilitated by the trend toward 
incorporating economics departments in business or management schools, which tend to 
be more open to heterodox economics and, indeed, to other disciplines in general than are 
economics departments. Non-economics departments therefore provide fertile ground for 
developments within heterodoxy. 
 But there is still a long way to go before disciplinary boundaries with economics 
break down. Much has been made of the integration of ideas from other disciplines into 
mainstream economics, eg in behavioural economics. But, because the mainstream 
methodological approach has not fundamentally altered, these ideas are limited to what 
can be incorporated within the mainstream framework. The goals for heterodox 
economics ultimately include influencing policy, aswell as the understanding of the 
community at large. But as long as the state refers to economics as a discipline for advice 
(or validation), and as long as economics maintains its disciplinary profile and expert 
status, then the impact of heterodox ideas which are not recognised as economics will 
accordingly be diminished. 
 What explains this continuing dominance of the mainstream? Adam Smith (1795) 
was the first economist to highlight the aesthetic aspects of persuasion, the method by 
which knowledge is both communicated and developed. Many find appealing the 
separateness and formalism of mainstream economics and what Kuhn (1962) called the 
‘normal science’ of puzzle-solving within an agreed framework. Chick (1995) goes some 
way towards exploring the psychological basis for such an appeal. It is also more 
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straightforward to teach mainstream models than the typ  of open-ended material of 
heterodox economics, which requires students to develop the capacity for judgement. It is 
also more straightforward to keep up with mainstream economics, since accepting 
mainstream economic methodology allows the definitio  of economics in terms of that 
methodology alone, precluding the need to look outside.  
 But this cannot fully explain the persistent power of mainstream economics. 
Mainstream economics has proved to be very resilient in the face of new challenges, 
shifting focus and absorbing new ideas as appropriate ( s emphasised for example by 
Davis 2008). There have been some changes to methodology, for example with respect to 
theory testing, so that now questionnaire evidence is admissible, for example, and indeed 
there has been an increasing emphasis on gathering v dence. But the core deductivist 
principles remain as the exclusive methodological approach, such that, while behavioural 
economics for example has introduced experimental evidence and new ideas about 
behaviour which challenge the core rationality axioms, the agenda is to improve the 
deductivist system rather than to replace it. It is this exclusivity which heterodox 
pluralism would reject. Some of the orthodox tools may be useful for some purposes as 
part of an open methodological system (pluralism of method). This is Chick’s strategy of 
containment with respect to methodology. 
 Lee draws attention to politics as a powerful force for determining the shape of 
economics. Indeed the main difference between his argument that pluralism was not 
present in the twentieth century and those who find pluralism, at least in the first half of 
the century if not in the present time, refers to the treatment of radical-Marxian 
economics rather than other forms of heterodoxy. Radical-Marxist economics has 
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developed ideas most challenging to free-market economics and thus to those with 
economic and political power. This is not to say that all mainstream economists are 
unequivocal supporters of the free market; New Keynesians for example support state 
intervention to address market imperfections. But some state intervention is in practice 
necessary for markets to function, so, although there may be confusion in terms of 
rhetoric, some intervention can promote the interess of those with economic power. 
Keynes himself took a reformist approach to capitalism. This is modified among many 
Post Keynesians by their interface with radical-Marxist thought, but their approach is still 
essentially reformist. So we can understand the inevitable difficulties faced by radical-
Marxist thought within capitalism, such that Bernal’s conclusion about the 
incompatibility between full knowledge and capitalism continues to apply, if capitalist 
politics inevitably suppress radical-Marxism.11  
 But what of other heterodox approaches? The mainstream absorbs ideas from 
elsewhere that can be incorporated into its system of thought but not the alternative 
systems of thought themselves. It is the whole concept of ‘system of thought’ which is so 
difficult to convey to those brought up on logical positivism, if they are exposed to any 
methodology at all. Part of the pluralist strategy requires some heterodox economists 
continuing to work on raising methodological awareness, either at the philosophical level, 
as Lawson (2006) for example is doing, or in historcal accounts of the evolution of 
theory, as Milonakis and Fine (2009) for example are doing.  
                                                
11 Care must always be taken to take account of localdifferences. For example, in contrast to the relations 
between heterodox economics and economics associations in the US and the UK, the Canadian Economics 
Association provides support at its Annual Conference for the sessions of the Progressive Economic Forum 
(PEF). 
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 But, given the institutional structure within the discipline, the best hope lies in 
pressure from outside. A Kuhnian revolution occurs when the ruling paradigm is seen to 
be inadequate in the face of pressing problems. The fall-out from the banking and 
economic crises is prompting some fundamental thinking, both inside and outside 
academic economics, as to the failings of the discipline. For example the general public is 
focusing on moral issues with respect not only to governance but also to distribution, 
while public sector institutions face criticism, for example about their own capacity to 
forecast economic variables. These are matters on which heterodox economics has a lot 
to say. Addressing these concerns directly in public fora raises the profile of heterodox 
economics and demonstrates its capacity to meet needs not met by mainstream 
economics. Even if heterodox economics were not able to supplant the mainstream, a 
more realistic goal would be to aim for a new spirit of tolerance within economics, such 
that heterodox research was given due acknowledgement and economics teaching 
covered a range of approaches. 
 The issues are complex, and all that has been attempted in this paper beyond an 
introduction to Lee’s book, is a limited contribution, from one perspective, to ongoing 
discussions about heterodox economics and about how to proceed. Lee’s book represents 
an important advance in terms of our knowledge of the history of heterodox economics, 
and awareness of the issues involved in considering its past and its future. The book itself 
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